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Chapter One 
Conceptualising Gender 
Diane Richardson 
 
Introduction 
What do we mean by gender?  The meaning of the terms sex and gender, and the 
ways that writers have theorized the relationship between the two, have changed 
considerably over the years. Prior to the 1960s, gender referred primarily to what is 
coded in language as masculine or feminine. Gender has subsequently been variously 
theorized as personality traits and behaviours that are specifically associated either 
with women or men (for example women  are caring ; men are aggressive), to any 
social construction having to do with the male-female distinction, including those 
which distinguish female bodies from male bodies; to being thought of as the 
existence of two different social groups `men' and `women' that are the product of 
unequal relationships (Alsop et al., 2002;  Connell and Pearse, 2014). In this latter 
sense, gender is understood as a hierarchy that exists in  society, where one group of 
people (men) have power and privilege over another group of people (women) 
(Delphy, 1993). More recent postmodern approaches, associated with the work of 
Judith Butler (2006, 2011) in particular, conceptualize gender as performance; where 
gender is understood as continuously produced through everyday practices and social 
interactions.  
    We need to understand these theoretical changes around the concept of gender not 
only in a historical sense, but also in terms of cultural context. In other words, it is 
important that we ask whether gender as a concept translates in different countries and 
cultures in a manner that is analytically useful. For instance, ‘in Scandanavia there are 
no separate words that cohere with the Anglo/American sex/gender distinction 
(Lempiainen, 2000). In Slavic languages, the same word is used for both terms 
(Bahovic, 2000). In Germany, the term gender has several meanings including 
grammatical and as a biological/social category (Wischermann, 2000)’ (Robinson, 
2006: 224). So we must not assume that gender as a concept is universal. Rather, as 
Walby (2004) argues, we need to develop understandings of gender that allow us to 
theorize both cultural variation and historical changes in understanding gender and 
gender relations. Historically it has been theories from the global North, in particular 
North America and Europe, which have dominated approaches to understanding 
gender. This has led to criticisms that theories largely based on western 
understandings have colonised ideas about gender in so far as they are extended to 
non-western contexts in ways that erase local understandings and cultural meanings. 
Connell (2007) makes this point in arguing for the need to recognize social theory 
from societies in the ‘global South’, which are often ignored or marginalized. The 
‘global South’ is a relational concept that emphasises unequal forms of power 
relations, both historically (colonial regimes for example) and contemporariously, 
between the North (the West) and South (the ‘rest’). In this binary way of thinking the 
‘global South’ can be understood as a umbrella term comprising a given set of 
countries or continents,  typically many countries in Africa, Central and Latin 
America, and parts of Asia.  However, as Connell (2007) suggests, such a binary view 
is overly simplistic and therefore we need to think critically about the use of the term 
‘global South’ if we are to avoid the dangers of over generalisation and reproducing 
Western-centredness in analyses of genders and sexualities (see also Brown et al., 
2010).  
 
   This chapter outlines the major changes that have taken place since the second part 
of the twentieth century in how we define gender. It begins with an examination of the 
use of the terms gender and sex and the distinction made between them, what is 
commonly called the sex/gender binary. In this discussion, I will illustrate how 
feminist gender theory has played an important role in developing our understandings 
of sex and gender. The chapter then goes on to discuss the development of theories of 
gender within feminism, as well as the contribution to understandings of gender made 
by queer theory.  In this section, I will look at how different theoretical approaches 
have led to different understandings of gender. The final section of the chapter 
examines the relationship between gender and sexuality.  This is important because, 
as I shall demonstrate, our understandings of gender are closely connected with the 
concept of sexuality as well as sex.  
 
The sex/gender binary 
During the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, it was the 
theories put forward by biologists, medical researchers and psychologists that 
dominated understandings of gender. These early accounts were mainly concerned 
with establishing ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ explanations for human behaviour. 
Researchers sought to discover underlying ‘sex differences’ which they believed 
produced different psychological and behavioural dispositions in males and females. 
They spoke of sex not gender and did not distinguish between the two as we often do 
today. Within these naturalistic approaches sex is conceptualised in terms of binaries: 
male/female; man/woman; masculine/feminine. In this binary thinking male and 
female are understood as ‘opposites’ who, despite their differences, compliment one 
another. This pairing of ‘opposite sexes’ is seen as natural. Gender here is understood 
to be a biological ‘fact’, a persons ‘sex’, which is pre-given and located in the body. 
This is an essentialist approach: a way of understanding the human self as having a 
timeless, universal biological ‘essence’ that exists beyond the bounds of social life. 
Although, as I shall go on to discuss, the precise location of ‘sex’ in the body (for 
example ovaries/testes, chromosomes, or nerve centres in the brain) has been the 
subject of considerable debate.  
 
   At the time, few within the social sciences questioned these ‘scientific’ theories 
about sexual difference.  For example, as Seidman (1997) argued, classical sociology 
both drew on and contributed to understandings of sex, gender and sexuality as binary 
categories ordained by nature. However, this was to change dramatically in the second 
part of the twentieth century as debates about how we conceptualise gender steadily 
grew. In the 1960s and 1970s a new way of thinking about gender began to emerge 
that critiqued earlier ‘essentialist’ frameworks, signalling a shift away from 
biologically based accounts of gender to social analysis. This shift from naturalizing 
to social constructionist accounts, although not necessarily denying the role of 
biology, emphasised the importance of social and cultural factors in defining gender. 
 
   At the same time as social scientists and historians were beginning to challenge the 
assumption that gender was rooted in ‘nature’, more and more people were beginning 
to question dominant ideas about gender roles. The late 1960s, early 1970s saw the 
emergence of both women’s and gay and lesbian liberation movements in the US and 
Europe (D’Emilio, 1998; Stein, 2012, see also Charles in this volume).  An important 
contribution to the study of gender at that time was the distinction that many of those 
involved in sexual politics - along with some sociologists, psychiatrists and 
psychologists - sought to make between the terms sex and gender. Sex referred to the 
biological differences between females and males defined in terms of the anatomy and 
physiology of the body; gender to the social meanings and value attached to being 
female or male in any given society, expressed in terms of the concepts femininity 
and masculinity. This distinction between sex (biological) and gender (cultural) is 
what is termed the sex/gender binary. A number of key assumptions associated with 
the sex/gender binary are summarised below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Sex/Gender Binary 
 A distinction can be made between sex (biology) and 
gender (culture) 
 Sex is biologically given and universal 
 Gender is historically and culturally variable 
 Sex consists of two - and only two-  types of human being 
 This two-sex model of sexual difference (the distinction 
between females and males) is a natural ‘fact of life’ 
 One sex in every body 
 Identities  develop as either one or other of these two 
sexes/genders  
 
  
   Studies of transsexuality were also very important to the differentiation between sex 
and gender. The sex/gender binary made it possible to imagine that a person could 
feel themselves to be a particular gender trapped in the ‘wrong’ sex, for instance a 
person who felt themselves to be a woman and feminine (their gender identity)  but 
who had a male body (their sex).  This was difficult to account for without allowing 
for a separation of body (sex) and gender (identity). (See also Hines in this volume.)  
 
   The sex/gender binary was also an important aspect of early feminist work and has 
since provided an important foundation for much feminist theory and politics. 
Feminists have used the sex/gender binary to argue for social change on the grounds 
that although there may exist certain biological differences between females and 
males, societies superimpose different norms of personality and behaviour that 
produce ‘women’ and ‘men’ as social categories.  It is this reasoning that led Simone 
de Beauvoir (1953) in the feminist classic The Second Sex to famously remark ‘One is 
not born, but rather becomes a woman’. We cannot, de Beauvoir argues, understand 
womanhood or manhood as fixed by nature, rather this is something that is acquired 
through the social process of becoming gendered. 
 
   During the late 1960s and early 1970s feminist writers expressed similar views in 
developing the idea of the sex/gender binary.  Ann Oakley, for instance, argued that it 
was important to distinguish between two separate processes that, at that time, she 
claimed were often confused. That is:  
 
…the tendency to differentiate by sex, and the tendency to differentiate in a particular 
way by sex. The first is genuinely a constant feature of human society but the second 
is not, and its inconstancy marks the division between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’: sex 
differences may be ‘natural’, but gender differences have their source in culture, not 
nature (Oakley, 1972: 189, emphasis added). 
 
   Oakley takes sex for granted in assuming that we all ‘have a sex’, sex is not 
something we acquire it is a constant, part of being human. Gender, by contrast, she 
understands to be the cultural interpretation of our biologically given sex. It is 
important to acknowledge that, at the time, this distinction between sex and gender 
was hailed as a conceptual breakthrough and ‘became one of the most fundamental 
assumptions in feminist gender theory from the 1970s on’ (Alsop et al., 2002: 26).  It 
was also very important to feminist politics as it supported the argument that the 
social roles men and women occupy are not fixed by nature and are open to change.   
 
   Anthropological work has also contributed significantly to these debates, 
highlighting the cultural variability of gender roles in different societies in different 
parts of the world. Of particular importance was Margaret Mead’s work on gender 
which, although it was first published in the 1930s, was reprinted and gained 
considerable attention in the 1960s (Mead, 1935/1963).  In her book Sex and 
Temperament in Three Primitive Societies Mead described contrasting gender roles in 
three different societies in Papua, New Guinea among the Arapesh, the Mundugumor 
and the Tchambuli. What was seen as particularly significant was that Mead claimed 
that among the Tchambuli gender roles were in stark contrast to those in the US at 
that time, with women occupying dominant positions. Although her work has since 
been subject to critique, it was a major source for the emerging women’s movement 
and the development of theories of gender that emphasised the social construction of 
gender roles.  
 
Sex as a social construction? 
More recently, a new understanding of sex and its relationship to gender has emerged. 
The distinction between sex and gender has been challenged by arguments that sex is 
just as much a social construction as gender. Rather than thinking about sex and 
gender as separate from one another, sex being the foundation upon which gender is 
superimposed, gender has increasingly been used to refer to any social construction to 
do with the female/male binary, including male and female bodies. This has led to 
debates about whether it is useful any more to differentiate between sex and gender. 
On this basis, many feminist writers have questioned the usefulness of the sex/gender 
binary that years earlier had seemed a conceptual breakthrough.  
 
   For example, both Christine Delphy (1984) and Judith Butler (2006) have argued 
that the body is not free from social interpretation, but is itself a socially constructed 
phenomenon. It is through understandings of gender that we interpret and establish 
meanings for bodily differences that are termed sexual difference (see also Butler, 
2011). In this model, sex is not something that one ‘has’ or a description of what 
someone is. Without the concept of gender we could not make sense of bodies as 
differently sexed. It is gender that provides the categories of meaning for us to 
interpret how a body appears to us as ‘sexed’.  In other words, gender creates sex 
rather than the other way around. 
 
 The variability of sex 
Historical research supports the argument that understandings of the body are socially 
constructed. In Making Sex, for example, Laqueur (1992) argues that the idea that 
human bodies divide into two different sexes - male and female - only became 
commonplace during the nineteenth century. Prior to then, it was thought that male 
and female bodies developed out of one type of body. The idea of two distinct 
biological sexes is associated with the development of science and medicine 
(Colebrook, 2004). Historical studies also show that what biological ‘facts’ determine 
sex has been the subject of much debate. Chromosomes, hormones, gonads 
(ovaries/testes), internal reproductive structures and genitalia have variously been 
seen as the basis for defining a person’s sex. For instance, studies of medical 
responses to cases of ‘doubtful sex’, - people who in the past were often referred to as 
third sex or hermaphrodites or more commonly nowadays intersex - suggest that 
definitions of what constitutes a male and a female body have changed. People born 
with a mixture of sexual markers, for example with both an ovary and a testis present 
in their body, challenged the idea that there is one ‘true sex’ in every human body and 
often resulted in disagreements between doctors over whether someone was ‘truly’ a 
male or a female (Dreger, 2000; Reis, 2012).  
 
   Studies of the medical management of intersex demonstrate how definitions of ‘sex’ 
have changed over time. What they also highlight is that the meanings of bodies and 
the assumptions made about the relationship between gender, identity and the body  
have varied from one historical period to the next (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Karkazis, 
2008). During the nineteenth century, for instance, doctors believed reproductive 
capacity - the presence in the body of ovaries or testes- characterized the sex of a 
person. This led in some cases to individuals being diagnosed a different sex to the 
one they themselves felt themselves to be. For example, in one case a woman who 
had lived all her life as female was ‘diagnosed’ as male because of the discovery of 
testes in the abdomen (Dreger, 2000). Here the truth of a person’s character is sought 
in the body, not in terms of how the person identifies. This is in stark contrast with 
medical opinion from the mid twentieth century, as illustrated by studies of children 
diagnosed as intersex such as those carried out by John Money and Anke Erhardt 
(1972/1996) who put forward a theory of ‘psychosexual neutrality’ which emphasised 
the role of gender assignment and gender of rearing rather than biological ‘sex’ in 
determining gender development. Studies of transsexuality by Stoller (1968) and 
others at that time also demonstrated how biological ‘sex’ and gender were not always 
one and the same. Such studies were not only supportive of the development of the 
sex/gender (body/identity) binary, as I suggested earlier, they also led to a privileging 
of identity over body in defining gender (see also Woodward in this volume). 
 
   The continuing concern to resolve bodily ambiguity in cases of ‘doubtful sex’, 
despite the fact that medical knowledge has demonstrated that there are many 
variations of sex and  human bodies are not fully dimorphic (always one thing or the 
other),  demonstrates the social importance of sex and gender. It suggests that there 
are strong reasons for wanting to sort people into two different groups and to maintain 
the idea of two separate sexes. In the nineteenth century, according to Dreger (2000), 
the main concern was the fear of social disorder that doctors believed could result 
from ‘misdiagnosed sex’. They thought that this would encourage both divorce and 
homosexuality. It is important to ask, then, why have doctors been so concerned to 
‘resolve’ cases of ‘doubtful sex’? If intersex people lived in a world where sex/gender 
was not socially important then arguably being of ‘doubtful sex’ would not matter in 
the way it does. In recent years an intersex political movement has emerged and 
various intersex organisations have been established such as, for example, the Intersex 
Society of North America (Preves, 2005).  Intersex activism includes those who 
object to the idea that human bodies should have to be defined as male or female, as 
well as campaigns to end unwanted genital surgeries for those considered to be 
intersex.  
 
   Recent studies of trans and intersex, as well as cross cultural work, have been 
important in continuing to problematize the gender binary system which divides 
people into the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’ (see Monro, 2010; Hines in this 
volume). This includes approaches to  theorising gender diversity as an expansion of  
gender categories beyond a simple binary of ‘male’/’female’ to include, for example 
people who identify as ‘third gender’.  
 
   There may then be two sexes but what I am suggesting here is that this is not a 
naturally occurring ‘fact of life’, rather it is a socially produced binary that exists 
because of the significance placed on defining bodies as gendered  as either male or 
female.  This is what has been termed the ‘medical invention of sex’, where bodies 
are literally shaped (operated upon) to fit the categories of sex and gender (Dreger, 
2000; Karkazis, 2008). By doing this, medicine constructs a single believable sex for 
each ambiguous body removing any challenge to prevailing ideas about what 
constitutes an ‘appropriate’ male of female body/sex.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
In this section I have described how understandings of the relationship between sex 
and gender have gone through a number of important phases over the last fifty or so 
years. 
 
Expanding Sex/Gender Binaries: ‘Third Gender’ 
Anthropological studies  of  gender  in non-Western contexts have also 
questioned sexual dimorphism in culture and history, based on western 
male/female gender binaries, through examination of gender diversity in 
different cultures that open up possibilities for new understandings of gender 
and sexuality.  This includes Serena Nanda’s (1990/1999) ‘classic’ Neither Man, 
Nor Woman, an account of the hijras of India who are typically born with male 
physiology, although some later undergo removal of the penis, scrotum and 
testicles, and who may identify with various gender categories including as 
‘third gender.’  The hijra communities have a long history in India going back 
more that four thousand years,  although there position was undermined under 
British colonialism (Monro 2010).  In 2014 the Supreme Court in India 
recognised hijras, as well as transgender people, as a ‘third gender’ in law. Other 
studies of ‘third gender’ categories that have contributed to challenging Western 
conceptualisations of gender and sexuality include, for example, those 
documented in the edited collections by Gilbert Herdt (1996/2003) and Peggy 
Reeves Sanday and Ruth Gallagher Goodenough (1990/1996). 
 
  First, sex (male/female) defines gender (masculine/feminine). 
 Second, a distinction is made between sex and gender (the sex/gender binary), 
where gender is understood as a social construct and sex is assumed to be a 
biological given. 
 Third, like gender, sex is also viewed as a social construction (gender creates 
sex). 
 Fourth, (as I shall go onto discuss) sex and gender have been combined. The 
term gender or ‘sex gender’ (Woodward in this volume) is thought to be more 
useful than distinguishing between the two.  
 
   I will now go on to consider theories of gender and the specific contribution made 
by feminist writers. In so doing, I will illustrate how the idea of gender has also 
undergone significant change.  
 
Feminist gender theory 
Feminists have critiqued essentialist understandings of gender and sex, and have 
played an important role in establishing a body of research and theory that supports 
social constructionist approaches. However, the main concern in feminist theories of 
gender is not simply to describe the ways in which gender is socially and culturally 
defined in any given society. For instance, whether ‘being a woman’ is associated 
with having the responsibility of childcare or whether ‘being a man’ is associated with 
being the principle breadwinner in a family structure. It is to develop understandings 
of how gender is connected to social, economic and cultural status and power in 
society. In this sense, gender is theorised not as difference but as a social division. 
Traditionally the term social division was used in relation to class hierarchies in 
society, most commonly inequalities between upper, middle and lower class.  The 
term social divisions is now used more broadly to refer to social, economic and 
cultural differentiation of groups in society on the basis of  other criteria besides class, 
including gender, race, ethnicity. To theorise gender as social division, therefore, is to 
examine how the social reproduction of gender difference in society is connected with 
the production of gender inequalities between men and women (Abbott, 2013) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Gender role 
The main focus of work on gender carried out during the 1970s and 80s was on 
exploring the production of masculinity and femininity. Many feminist writers, as I 
stated in the previous section, argued that gender is culturally determined and that we 
become differently gendered through socialization into gender roles, or as it was often 
termed then ‘sex roles’. Sex role theory, drawing on the principles of social leaning 
theory, claimed that through various learning processes (for example observation, 
imitation, modelling, differential reinforcement) and agencies of socialization (for 
example parents, teachers, peers, the media) children learn the social meanings, 
values, norms and expectations associated with ‘being a girl’ or ‘being a boy’ and 
thereby learn to develop ways of behaving and personality characteristics considered 
appropriate (or not) for  being a woman or man (Alsop et al., 2002; Rahman and 
Jackson, 2010).  Gender is here defined as the learning of culturally and historically 
specific social roles associated with women or men, and used to describe someone as 
masculine or feminine. This is what we might refer to nowadays as the process of 
becoming gendered, involving learning specific ideas, practices and values associated 
with gender.   
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   As Connell (2009/2014) points out, a great deal of research by social psychologists 
and anthropologists in particular has sought to explore the development of gender 
roles. That is, to explain the mechanisms of acquisition and the key sites of learning 
gender roles, as well as documenting variation in gender roles in different cultures 
(see discussion of Mead’s work earlier). The socialization of a child into a specific 
gender role has also been a controversial issue more recently over the rights of parents 
to raise a child as ‘gender neutral’ with, in some cases, parents keeping the gender of 
their child a secret from all but their closest friends and family to reveal to avoid 
gender stereotyping. 
 
However, feminist theories of gender, as I indicated above, are not interested in 
simply describing how girls and boys grow up differently and become gendered, and 
how that may or may not be resisted through education and parenting, but how a key 
 
Becoming Gendered 
 Gender Labelling 
 Attribute terms boy, girl, woman, man to self and others 
 Gender Knowledge  
Culturally specific knowledge about gender 
 Universality of Gender 
 The idea that all human beings ‘have’ a gender 
 Gender Constancy 
 The idea that gender is unchanging 
aspect of that difference is understanding that girls and boys, women and men, have 
different social status and value.  This focus on gender inequality is on how gender 
role expectations, in particular the expectation that a woman’s primary role is to be a 
good wife and mother, limits girls in a myriad of ways as they grow up, especially in 
terms of educational aspirations and the type of jobs they might end up doing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Gender as hierarchy 
These early socialization theories of gender appear to us now as rather naïve and far 
too simplistic. From thinking about gender roles in terms of either masculinity or 
femininity, we now recognize that there are multiple genders and many patterns of 
masculinities and femininities what some refer to as gender pluralism or gender 
diversity identity (Monro, 2005).  At the time, feminists were among those who 
Moving Beyond Gender? 
 
Sweden’s capital Stockholm is home to a ‘gender neutral’ preschool 
Egalia, which is the Swedish word for equality.  The aim is to not 
limit children to social expectations based on their ascribed gender. 
Teachers avoid using gendered terms like him and her, and refer to 
children by their first names or as ‘hen’, a genderless pronoun taken 
from the Finnish language. Books are selected to avoid traditional 
presentations of gender and parenting roles.  This reflects wider 
policy towards gender equality in Sweden.  Breaking down gender 
roles is a core aspect of the national curriculum for preschools and 
many schools have gender advisors to identify language and practices 
that may reinforce gender stereotypes. 
critiqued sex role theory, in particular pointing out that it was a highly mechanistic 
and static account of gender that  attributed little agency to subjects who were 
assumed to acquire a certain gender role by simply internalizing what they had been 
taught. Feminists argued that such theories of gender were oversimplified as many 
young people reject what they are taught and resist social norms and cultural 
assumptions about gendered roles (Rahman and Jackson, 2010). This was clearly in 
keeping with the feminist political goal of challenging gender role expectations and 
norms which were seen as restricting women’s lives. 
 
   By the end of 1970s feminist theories of gender were becoming increasingly more 
sophisticated. Some writers took Oakley’s and other feminist critiques of essentialist 
understandings of gender a step further by questioning the existence of the category of 
gender itself. The development of such an analysis of gender is particularly associated 
with the work of materialist feminists such as Christine Delphy (1984) and Monique 
Wittig (1981/1992). Although Delphy and Wittig recognized the importance of 
demonstrating that the meaning of ‘gender’ is historically and culturally specific, they 
argued that the concept of gender should not be taken for granted. In other words, 
they questioned the idea that gender is a universal category, which it can be assumed 
will always exist in some form or other in all times and places. Instead, they defined 
gender as a socially constructed product of patriarchal hierarchies (Jackson, 1999).  
Gender here is understood to be the result of gendered power differences. For 
example, in her paper One is Not Born a Woman, echoing Simone de Beauvoir whose 
work I mentioned earlier, Wittig (1981/1992) argues that gender is an imaginary 
foundation, the outcome of a social hierarchy where one class of people (men) have 
power and privilege over another class of people (women). The categories ‘woman’ 
and ‘man’ are relative, defined by a specific social and economic position in society. 
Gender is commonly thought to be the cause of one’s social and economic position 
(a). Here gender derives from one’s place in the social hierarchies that exist in society 
(b). In other words, gender is the mark of one’s subordination as a woman rather than 
its basis.  
 
(a) One’s gender as ‘Woman’  leads to social subordination 
 
(b) Patriarchal hierarchies define one as a ‘Woman’ 
 
   For those feminists who agree with such analyses of gender relations, the political 
goal of challenging gendered power differences will, as a consequence, lead to the 
elimination of the idea of gender. Gender categories would not exist if social divisions 
did not exist.  This idea of  a world without gender can be found in more recent 
feminist work that is not only concerned with social transformations towards ending 
gender inequality, but seeks a de-gendering of society that some writers refer to as 
‘undoing gender’ (see Lorber, 2005; Deutsch, 2007).  This approach argues for 
moving towards a non-gendered social order, based on equality without gender 
categorisation. 
 
   New conceptualizations of gender associated with postmodernism and the rise of 
queer theory emerged in the 1990s, which shifted the emphasis away from definitions 
of gender as fixed, coherent and stable, towards seeing gender categories as plural, 
provisional and situated. At the time, poststructural models of power, influenced by 
Foucault’s work (Foucault, 1979), demanded a more complex account of gender as 
hierarchy.  Foucault’s account of power moved away from the idea of power as 
something possessed and wielded by social institutions and particular groups in 
society,  towards  the idea that ‘power is everywhere’; diffuse rather than concentrated 
and enacted through discourses rather than possessed. These new conceptualizations 
of gendered power relations were also connected with the partial shift in feminist 
thinking during the 1980s away from a primary focus on divisions between women 
and men, to theorizing difference between women, in particular of class, race, 
ethnicity, and sexuality and, associated with this, the problematisation of the category 
‘woman’ (Mohanty, 1988; Bhavnani, 1997; see also Hines in this volume). What 
these developments highlighted was the need for theoretical approaches that 
recognized the complexity of social hierarchies and attempted to theorize the 
intersections of gender with other social inequalities through an intersectionality 
framework.   
 
Intersectionality 
Intersectionality has its roots in anti-racist feminism in the US. The term has been 
attributed to Kimberle Crenshaw, but work of other black feminists such as, for 
example, Patricia Hill Collins (1990/ 2000) in Black Feminist Thought and bell hooks 
(1981) in her book Ain’t I a Woman, raised similar issues about the need to 
understand how gender intersects with race even before the term intersectionality was 
coined. Indeed, the fact that hooks named her book after the African-American 
abolitionist and women’s rights activist Sojouner Truth’s speech given at  a women' 
rights convention in Ohio in 1851  demonstrates the even greater historical legacy of  
these concerns.  
 
For Crenshaw: 
  …the concept of intersectionality [is used] to denote the various ways in which race 
and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black 
women’s…experiences. …my focus on the intersections of race and gender only 
highlights the need to account for multiple grounds of identity when considering how 
the social world is constructed. (Crenshaw, 1991:1244, 1245) 
 
   Since the 1980s and 1990s studies of intersectionality have proliferated across a 
wide range of contexts. There is no singular definition of intersectionality, rather there 
is a great deal of variation in the way it is now theorized and applied.  Broadly 
speaking, intersectionality provides a way of understanding the interaction of different 
forms of disadvantage and inequality as a means of analyzing multiple identities and 
experiences of inequality, focusing on the linkages between categories such as race 
and gender. It means more than the sum of the parts such as, for example, the notion 
that black women are ‘doubly disadvantaged’ as a consequence of racism and sexism; 
and represents a move towards more complex models of understanding of how 
different forms of inequality are ‘routed through one other’ (Grabham et al., 2009:1). 
For instance, this might involve an exploration of how categories such as race, 
sexuality and gender are co-constituted; that is: the social processes through which 
these categories inform and shape each other. One of the criticisms that has been 
made of intersectionality theory is that there was a tendency to focus on race and 
gender to the exclusion of other social categories. More recent work has addressed 
this for example looking at the intersections between gender and other categories  
including class, age, disability and sexuality (Richardson 2007;  Grabham et al., 2009; 
Taylor et al., 2011; Richardson and Monro, 2012). For a broader discussion of some 
of the other ways in which the concept of intersectionality has been problematized 
within feminist theory see, for example, Yuval-Davis (2006) and Anthias (2012).   
 
‘Doing gender’: gender as performativity  
 It is the work of Judith Butler (2006, 2011) in particular that is associated with this 
theoretical shift and which has had a profound influence on theorising gender. (See 
also Hines and Woodward in this volume.) Butler’s work, especially her book Gender 
Trouble first published in 1990, has been highly influential in the development of 
queer theory (see p. 00 and Hines in this volume). In Gender Trouble Butler: 
 
 proposes a new understanding of gender as performance; 
 questions the usefulness of the sex/gender binary; 
 suggests heterosexuality is an effect of gender.   
 
   Butler argues that gender is performatively enacted. In her early work she used drag 
to convey what she means. Typically drag is understood as impersonation: a drag 
queen is a ‘real’ man giving a performance as a woman. Butler argues that there are 
parallels between drag and the performance of gender in everyday life: gender is a 
kind of impersonation that passes for real. Gender is constituted out of attempts to 
compel belief in others that we are ‘really’ a woman or a man. For Butler, there is no 
‘real’ gender of which drag is an impersonation. She claims ‘there is no gender 
identity behind the expressions of gender’, arguing instead that identity is constituted 
by ‘the very “expressions” that are said to be its results’ (Butler,1990: 25). What she 
means by this is that we assume that a person performed in a certain way because that 
person is a man or a woman. In this sense Butler’s notion of gender performance is 
different from how the term performance is usually used; that is, to refer to a subject 
(the doer) who is formed prior to the acts s/he chooses to perform (do). For Butler, 
performances are performative in that they bring into being gendered subjects.  The 
act of performance is productive rather than expressive of gender. It is through ‘doing 
gender’ that we produce the effect that there was some gendered person who preceded 
the performance: ‘the doer’. This, for Butler, is a continual process.  So while it might 
seem to us certain that a person is a woman, Butler is suggesting that this is not fixed 
or stable. Gender, it is argued, is a process of continuous construction that produces 
the effect (an illusion) of being natural and stable through gender performances that 
make us ‘women’ and ‘men’. A person might seem to have a particular identity, but 
this is only because we keep doing things that maintain the appearance of us ‘being 
the same’. Theories of performativity, then, challenge the idea that gender identities 
are simply ‘always there’, claiming instead we are constantly becoming gendered 
through performances that constitute us as ‘women’ or ‘men’ in a variety of ways.  
 
   One of the criticisms made of poststructuralist/postmodern accounts of gender is 
that they appear to have little interest in discussing material inequalities between 
women and men (Hennessey, 2012). This is seen as having serious consequences for 
feminist politics. For example, Martha Nussbaum has been highly critical of Butler’s 
approach because she claims it is an individualized approach that is not concerned 
with social change that challenges the social injustices experienced by women 
(Nussbaum, 1999).  
 
   Butler also questions the idea that heterosexuality is natural. She argues that 
heterosexuality is ‘unstable’, dependent on ongoing, continuous and repeated 
performances of normative gender identities, which produce the illusion of stability. 
There is no ‘real’ or ‘natural’ sexuality to be copied or imitated: heterosexuality is 
itself continually in the process of being re-produced. As well as denaturalising 
gender and heterosexuality, Butler also questions biological understandings of ‘sex’ in 
arguing that sex is as culturally constructed as gender. As a consequence, as I pointed 
out earlier in the chapter, she questions the usefulness of making a distinction between 
sex and gender. This disruption of the sex/gender binary has been identified by some 
feminist writers as being one of the most important contributions of queer theorists to 
feminist theory (Martin, 1998).  
 
   However, it is important to acknowledge similar arguments in the literature that 
precede postmodern/queer accounts of ‘doing gender’.   Ideas of about the making of 
identities through performance and performativity predate Butler and have their 
antecedents in work by people like Erving Goffman (1969) and Harold Garfinkel 
(1967), as well as earlier theories of gender.  In their landmark article ‘Doing 
Gender’, for example, Candance West and Don Zimmerman (1987) highlight the 
importance of everyday social interaction in the social (re)production of gender, and 
exposed the weaknesses of earlier socialization theories as well as structural 
approaches to gender. Similarly in relation to challenging understandings of the 
sex/gender binary, as early as 1978 Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna analysed 
transsexuality (rather than drag) as illustrative of the everyday ‘doing of gender’ in 
order to show how people are rendered intelligible to us as either ‘male’ or ‘female’ 
through the successful (or not) performance of bodily appearance and characteristics, 
behaviours, and language that we expect from men and women, and that we then 
interpret as a valid expression (or not) of their ‘real’ sex.  Sex, in this sense, is 
constructed through everyday social interactions that are reliant upon gender norms, 
which enable us to make sense of a person as ‘male’ or ‘female’ (Kessler and 
McKenna, 1978; 2000). 
 
   In this section I have described how the concept of gender has developed in a 
number of important ways.  Theories of gender have  problematized the gender binary 
system which divides people into the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’ in ways that 
allow for more complex understandings of gender.  Within this literature a number of 
approaches have been identified: expanding gender categories by adding more 
genders (e.g. ‘third gender’); moving beyond gender towards a society without gender 
categories (e.g. people who identify as ‘non-gendered’) and, arising out of  
poststructural theories that understand gender as fluid and plural, gender pluralism 
where gender is conceptualised as an intersecting range along a continuum that 
includes, for example, people who feel multiply gendered (see Monro, 2010 for 
further discussion of these different approaches).  To summarize:  
 
 Rather than a binary we now understand gender to be multiple and context 
specific; 
 There is a shift towards more materialist and embodied accounts of gender; 
 Greater attention is given to develop understandings of gender as a site of 
agency as well as inequality; 
 Intersectionality provides a framework for understanding gender and its co-
construction with other social categories/locations. 
 
    
    The first part of this chapter looked at how understandings of gender rely on 
particular understandings of the relationship sex has to gender. In the final section I 
will go on to examine the question of how the relationship between gender and 
sexuality has been theorized. This is necessary because our ideas about gender are 
also connected to ideas about sexuality.  Indeed, in the majority of feminist theories of 
gender it has been assumed that ‘gender and sexuality have to be examined together’ 
(McLaughlin et al., 2012:1). 
 
Gender and sexuality  
Four broad approaches can be identified that have structured the study of gender and 
sexuality and ways of understanding their relationship.  
 
Naturalist approaches  
As I stated in the first part of this chapter, from the middle of the nineteenth century to 
the second half of the twentieth century naturalist approaches dominated 
understandings gender (sex) and sexuality. The relationship between the two was 
understood as an expression of something natural, a universal order that was 
heterosexual and where ‘it is assumed that sex-gender-sexuality relate in a 
hierarchical, congruent and coherent manner’ (Richardson, 2007: 460). For instance, 
using this principle it was expected that a biological female should naturally grow up 
to experience herself as a female and have a feminine gender identity, and that her 
sexual practices and sexual identity should be heterosexual. This is what is meant by 
the principle of sexual and gender coherence. This helps us to understand why ‘cross 
gender identity’ (e.g. feminine men or masculine women) has historically been central 
to theories of homosexuality. Within this approach sexuality is understood to be a 
property of gender, a gender that is pre-given and located in the gendered/sexed body. 
Thus, the masculinization of lesbians and the feminization of male homosexuals is 
also associated with understanding the lesbian and  male homosexual body as ‘cross 
gendered’ (Richardson, 2007; Butler, 2011). This is evident, for example, in historical 
studies of medical accounts of ‘homosexuality’ that describe lesbians as boyish, with 
narrow hips, flat chests and ‘spectacular clitorises’ capable of vaginal penetration and 
male homosexuals having ‘feminized’ bodies (Terry, 1999), as well as more recent 
claims that gay men have ‘feminized brains’ (Le Vay, 2012).  
 
Feminist approaches 
Feminist writers, as I discussed earlier in the chapter, were among the first to 
challenge essentialist frameworks for understanding gender and sexuality. However 
what they did not do, in the main, was suggest that these two concepts should be de-
coupled from one another.  
 
   Feminist theories of gender offer two broad approaches to understanding the 
relationship between gender and sexuality. In the first of these: 
 
 Gender is prioritized over sexuality 
 
In most feminist accounts it is assumed that gender and sexuality need to be examined 
together and, also, that gender takes precedence over sexuality. That is, concepts of 
sexuality are understood to be largely founded upon notions of gender. This tradition 
is associated with earlier feminist writers such as Wittig (1981/1992) and Delphy 
(1984), as well as more contemporary feminist work. For example, Stevi Jackson 
argues for the logical priority of gender over sexuality. She claims that ‘…without 
gender categories we could not categorize sexual desires and identities along the axis 
of same-gender or other-gender relationships, as heterosexual, bisexual or 
homosexual/lesbian’ (Jackson, 2012: 40). In other words, our understanding of sexual 
categories like ‘gay’ or ‘straight’ depend on knowing the gender of a person. 
 
   In the second main approach that I have identified in feminist work on gender: 
 
  Sexuality is prioritised over gender 
 
Here, sexuality is understood to be constitutive of gender. Traditionally this is an 
underlying assumption in psychoanalytic accounts, as well as informing the work of 
some feminists. For example, Catherine MacKinnon (1982) suggested that it is 
through the experience of sexuality, as it is currently constructed, that women learn 
about gender; learn what ‘being a woman’ means. As well as constituting our 
gendered subjectivities, MacKinnon argued that sexuality (heterosexuality in 
particular) is the cause of gender inequality:  ‘Women and men are divided by gender, 
made into the sexes as we know them, by the social requirements of heterosexuality, 
which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and female sexual submission’ 
(MacKinnon,1982: 516). From this perspective, understandings of gender are located 
in terms of an analysis of how sexuality both reflects and constitutes patriarchal 
values and practices (Walby, 1990). More recent feminist work has developed the 
argument that gender is an effect of sexuality. For example, Chrys Ingraham (1996, 
2005) raises the question of whether without institutionalized heterosexuality gender 
would even exist.  
 
   In these debates, feminist theories have extended definitions of gender and sexuality 
in going beyond considerations of how the link between them is socially constructed, 
to viewing their relationship as one of the key mechanisms by which gender 
inequalities are  (re)produced (Jackson and Scott, 2010)   
 
Queer distinctions 
The assumption that gender and sexuality need to be examined together remained 
relatively unchallenged until the emergence of queer theory in the 1990s. The 
distinction between sexuality and gender has been at the heart of debates about queer 
theory and its relationship to feminist thought. According to Merck et al. (1998:1) the 
emergence of queer theory meant that it and feminism were now ‘widely understood 
to be two fields of study’ with the investigation of sexuality seen as the ‘proper 
subject’ of queer theory and the analysis of gender that of feminism.  While some 
agree with this position, many writers prefer instead to think about how feminist and 
queer theories are interconnected and can enrich each other (Richardson et al., 2012) 
and some write as queer/feminists.  
 
   Queer theory is associated with postructuralist/postmodern approaches to sexuality 
and gender, and a critique of feminist theories of sexuality that are seen as limited by 
an emphasis on gender (Warner, 1993; Seidman, 1996; Jagose, 1997; Sullivan, 2004). 
(Equally, some feminists argue that queer theory risks paying insufficient attention to 
gender in its analyses of sexuality see, for example, Walters (2005) and Richardson 
Comment [n1]: No longer a box 
(2012).) It rejects the idea of stable and unified gender and sexual categories and 
emphasizes the fluidity, instability and fragmentation of identities and a multiplicity 
of sexuality and gender categories. Associated with this is a shift in ‘definitions of 
gender away from social division towards an understanding of gender as cultural 
distinction.’ (McLaughlin et al., 2012: 18). Queer theory also questions the 
assumption that there are specific connections between sex, gender and sexuality, 
what I referred to above as the principle of sexual and gender ‘coherence’. In queer 
accounts the relationship between sexuality and gender is not seen as fixed and static, 
but as highly complex and unstable. 
 
   Various writers associated with queer theory have put forward arguments for 
theorizing sexuality independently from gender. Gayle Rubin’s work has been 
influential in the development of such arguments. In the early 1980s Rubin argued 
that although connected gender and sexuality ‘are not the same thing’ (Rubin, 1984: 
308). Opposed to the view that sexuality can be adequately understood as causing 
gender, Rubin instead offered an account of what she termed a ‘sex/gender system’ in 
which she separates out sexuality and gender. Queer writers have subsequently drawn 
on these ideas in developing their theories of gender. For example in what has become 
a queer ‘classic’, Eve Sedgwick in the Epistemology of the Closet (1990/ 2008). 
makes the case for a radical separation of gender and sexuality. Doing this, Sedgwick 
argues, opens up our understandings of gender and sexuality, as well the links 
between them, allowing more complex and diverse understandings. This means that 
new sexual and gender stories may begin to be told, heard and experienced.  For 
instance, it allows the possibility to think about ‘sexualities without genders’ (Martin, 
1998), where sexual desires, practices and identities do not depend on a person’s 
gender for their meaning. Similarly it enables recognition of the existence of multiple 
genders as illustrated, for example, by studies of female masculinities (Halberstam, 
1998) and transgender (Monro, 2005; Hines, 2007; Stryker, 2008).  
 
New imaginings: ‘patterned fluidities’ 
As I have indicated above, modernist understandings of gender and sexuality as fixed, 
coherent and stable have been challenged by queer/feminist, postmodern and 
poststructualist accounts that conceptualise these categories as plural, provisional and 
situated. And if there are multiple genders and multiple sexualities then it is also 
likely that there will be multiple relationships between these categories. This means 
we need to consider how different sexual categories relate to different genders. A 
challenge for future theories of gender and sexuality, therefore, is to develop 
frameworks that allow more complex accounts of how gender and sexuality are 
related to each other.  
 
   To achieve this we need to consider the question of the relationship of gender and 
sexuality at a number of levels. This opens up the possibility that rather than thinking 
of gender and sexuality as separate areas of analysis, as do many queer theorists, or as 
interrelated, as do many feminist writers, they can be conceptualised as both 
depending on the level of analysis and the social context. Jackson (2012) identifies 
four levels of social construction of the relations between gender and sexuality. 
 
 the structural; 
 the level of social and cultural meaning; 
 the level of everyday interactions and routine practices; 
 the level of subjectivity. 
 
   At any one of these intersecting levels Jackson suggests that the relationship 
between gender and sexuality may be different. Like Jackson, I agree that we need to 
conceptualize gender at different levels to enable ‘new ways of articulating and 
understanding the diversity of contemporary gender and sexual categories and the 
complexities of their relationship with one another’ (Richardson, 2007: 458). In 
attempting to represent the connections between gender and sexuality a number of 
writers have used the metaphor of a theoretical ‘knot’ (Alsop et al., 2002) or a 
‘complex web’ (Jackson, 2012).  However, I would argue that these metaphors are too 
static to aid understandings of the relationship between gender and sexuality as a 
dynamic, historically and socially specific multilayered process. For this we need a 
different metaphor. Elsewhere I have outlined what might help us in this re-imagining 
(Richardson, 2007). This is the metaphor of the shoreline: a boundary in motion 
between land (configured as gender) and sea (configured as sexuality) and where, like 
the connections between genders and sexualities, there are ‘patterned fluidities’.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a brief overview of some of the different ways in which we 
can theorize gender and the contribution that feminist work in particular has made. 
The references it contains and the suggestions for further reading given below will 
help you to develop your understanding and recognize the complexities of many of 
the ideas I have touched on. Examining theories of gender is important not only in an 
academic sense, but also because it is through analysing different ways of theorizing 
that we are able ‘to interrogate the processes whereby people generally become 
divided into the two categories male and female’ (Alsop et al., 2002:2). This is a 
process of categorisation that, as the remainder of this book will demonstrate, has 
important social, economic and personal implications. Moreover, it is important to 
acknowledge that the theories that we use to make sense of gender are part of this 
process and the meanings that derive from gender categorization. Theories of gender 
are not simply descriptions of ‘what is’, they actively structure the social worlds we 
inhabit. In the past, theories that assumed biology had a determining role in how we 
develop as women and men were used not merely to explain ‘sex differences’, but 
also to justify certain social arrangements as natural (Alsop et al., 2002). For instance, 
the idea that it was natural for women to want to have children and to care for them, 
and unnatural for men to feel the same, has often been used to both explain and justify 
why women have primary responsibility for childcare. In theorizing gender we are, 
then, actively engaged in a political process, an assumption that is central to the 
project of feminist gender theory. As McLaughin et al. (2012: 18) state:  ‘If feminism 
has one legacy to take forward...it is the legitimacy of using political criteria as the 
marker for the validity of social theorising.’ That is: the pursuit of knowledge not just 
for its own sake, but for social change. It is this that has inspired much of the research 
you will read about in this book and which continues to motivate teachers and 
students of gender and women’s students.  
 
Further Reading 
 
R. Alsop, A. Fitzsimons and K. Lennon (2002) theorizing gender, Oxford, Polity. 
This is a good overview of the important debates in theories of gender. The book 
discusses the major theories concerned with the way we ‘become gendered’. There 
are chapters on the body, men and masculinities, gender politics, and the relation 
between gender and sexuality, as well as discussion of transgender and queer 
approaches to understanding gender.  
 
H. Bradley (2012) Gender, 2
nd
 edn., Oxford, Polity. This is an accessible introduction 
to the concept of gender and the different theoretical approaches that have developed 
within women’s and gender studies. It explores contemporary relations of masculinity 
and femininity and highlights how our thinking about gender is influenced by 
changing political contexts. It uses life narratives to help contextualize the theory.  
 
R. W. Connell and R. Pearse (2014) Gender, 3rd edn., Oxford, Polity. This is a good 
introduction to the sociological study of gender. Written in a highly readable and 
accessible style, The authors trace the history of western ideas about gender, discusses 
the processes by which individuals become gendered as well as reviewing studies on 
gender differences. The book examines gender inequalities and patterns in modern 
society, and offers a contemporary framework for understanding gender in a global 
context drawing on empirical research from all over the world. The updated third 
edition also has a new chapter on ecofeminism, environmental justice and 
sustainability. 
 
J. Marchbank and G. Letherby (2014) Introduction to Gender: Social Science 
Perspectives,  2
nd
 edn., Harlow, Pearson Longman.  An interdisciplinary introduction 
to the key themes and debates within gender studies, it explores how gender is 
analysed in different disciplines including history, sociology, social policy, 
anthropology, psychology, political science, pedagogy and  geography. It then goes 
on to look thematically at  a number of key areas of debate in gender studies including 
family, health and illness, education, work and leisure, sex and sexuality, violence and 
resistance, crime and deviance, and culture and mass media. 
 
A.S. Wharton (2011) The Sociology of Gender. An Introduction to Theory and 
Research, 2nd edn., London, Wiley-Blackwell. This book presents an introductory 
overview of gender theory and research, including cross-national studies. It examines 
gender through three different frameworks: individualistic (the ways in which gender 
shapes individuals), interactional (gender in social interactions) and institutional (how 
gender is built into organizations, social structures and institutional arrangements). 
Also addressed is the importance of analysing how gender intersects with other kinds 
of distinctions such as those based on race, ethnicity, sexuality etc. 
 
Questions 
1. How can it be argued that gender is a ‘social construct’? 
2. What does it mean to refer to gender as social division? 
3. How has the sex/gender binary been important in understanding gender? 
4. What is the relationship between gender and sexuality? 
 
? What difficulties might be associated with a ‘de-gendering’ of society? What 
advantages might there be? 
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